AVA Proposal Ideas

By June 30, 2020DApps
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Ava proposal ideas:

Preface: Game designers who work with Javascript could all submit their open source game projects to a forum where they are organized and and installed into an arcade. Different games, such as gambling games, minigames, spinoffs of classical arcade games, and other fun games can all be listed on this site. Some games might cost money to play, and some might be free. These games could have active ranking by either participation or tips and/or money collected.

I for one am creating a game and would love to see a platform like this to host it.

Preface: Inspired by BSV's bsvapps.net, we should have an AVA dapp/app ranking system where people can tip apps to bring them to the top of the list. This helps noobs discover new tools to play with, and also helps dapp creators.

Economic Model: I would suggest a model where about a maximum of 80% of all tips go to the dapp creator, and the remaining 20% goes to somewhere else such as Ava labs, the website maintainer, or charity projects. The reason i am saying that not 100% of tips should go to the dapp creator is because a dapp creator could game the system by tipping their own project with their own personal money at no loss. If a dapp creator wants pay-to-advertisement, then they need to pay for it.

Preface: Dapp creators could be able to use brute-force advertising methods to adverise to AVA holders about their businesses. The way this works is you create a tool that anyone can send money to with an op return message, with a built-in filtering system, and maybe an option to increase the tip amount, and you load it up with a few dollars or maybe even a few hundred dollars and watch it shoot the chain with messages. Anyone with an AVA wallet may receive an onchain advertisement where they are tipped a small amount and given a link and a description to someone's product. This is essentially a roundabout way of doing the Brave/BAT token model of advertising, but it simultaneously also stresses (and therefore exercises) the chain, making validators stronger.

Preface: This is a highly theoretical concept I have been pondering for some time, and incorporates algorithmic rewarding and results in decentralized automated adoption. Imagine if you could pay people to buy goods and services with a cryptocurrency. Of course if you tried to implement this naively, people could just send money to themselves in a roundabout way and get free money for doing nothing. But WHAT IF you could use an automated algorithmic and logical chain-tracing to fix this problem?

How to possibly do this: There are two kinds of transactions. A "Move" transaction, where you put money from one address into another empty address, and a "Mix" transaction where money sent from your address goes to another address with a history of money in it, mostly disconnected from the history of money movement in your address.

With a chain of Move transactions, you can only reward spenders less than or equal to the cost of the accumulated transaction fees from Point A to Point B over an arbitrary number of hops.

With a chain of Mix transactions however, you can safely assume that any two wallets that don't share a money flow history are an economic transaction that could be rewarded. One could of course own two wallets and make money from two different sources and cheat a little bit this way however, so repeated Mix transactions should have diminishing returns with familiar merchants.

Once you establish a maximum amount of money you could donate to spenders without breaking the incentives of the system, you could simply pay that or less than that according to the funds available.

Funding solutions:

1) Donations. People who dont want to do the work of using and spending AVA themselves could just donate so that others can. Not everyone has the same skills and the same personality traits, so some may opt to donate instead of act directly.

2) Sponsorships (See my Proposal #3): Different projects can advertise their product in return for donating to this service by putting a link to their website in the op return of the tip they send to the economic spender.

3) Adoption/Infrastructure Funding Proposal: Validators could agree to divert some money to a project like this if its deemed valuable enough.

Final Thoughts on this: Combining the powers of making interest on holding AVA (very easy to implement) and making interest on Spending and Using AVA (harder to implement) would make AVA fundamentally the best money in existence, as no other money in the history of the world is deflationary and pays you to both hold it and use it, on a digital and distributed level.

Preface: This is another highly theoretical concept i have been pondering for a while now, but i think it would bring a totally new level of innovation to whatever chain it is deployed on. Basically a market for charity, where even selfish speculators are attracted to giving charity.

How it works:

All fundraisers specify three elements:

1) Network Fee

2) Position Count and Size

3) Capital

The Network Fee is a pledge that says IF your fundraiser is completed in totality, then X dollars or X percentage of your fundraiser is donated away to maintain the health of the network. Those who pay a higher network fee have their fundraisers advertised and listed at the top.

Position Count and Size is simply a way of saying how much one has to donate to fill a position. For example, a fundraiser worth $1000 could have 20 positions worth $50 each. You can fill out as many positions as you want, however you must fill out a whole position or the system will not recognize you as a donater.

Capital: The amount of money set aside by the fundraiser organizer, and/or by "Investors" into the fundraiser.

Economic Scheme: IF a fundraiser is completed, the fundraiser organizer receives the donations and his/her capital back. IF a fundraiser is not completed, all Positions are refunded with Interest from the Capital (unless you check an optional box that says "do not refund"). Essentially, people can donate to fundraisers even with a selfish expectation of getting money back, and if enough people do it at once, the fundraiser is completed.

The role of "Investors": Not all fundraiser organizers have money to set aside for Capital. This is where Investors come in. An investor sets Capital into a fundraiser, in return for a portion of the Network Fee, proportional to the amount of Capital they donate (if theres multiple investors, otherwise they get 100% of n% of the Network Fee). Investors get nothing and lose capital money if the fundraiser fails, and get part of the network fee if the fundraiser succeeds.

Where the rest of the Network Fee goes: Paying people with karma to review fundraiser proposals prior to them being released on the market. Bad fundraisers can attract greedy investors who want to exploit the capital. This economic force should be tamed and redirected to the good fundraisers, so that scams don't absorb most of the market share of fundraisers. Therefore, bad fundraisers with bad reviews are flagged and stipulated, in which they are not advertised on the network, and nobody will be refunded for donating to them, essentially killing any desire for greedy investors to mess with them.

How to pay reviewers: Assuming they start off with good karma, reviewers should be rewarded for agreeing with the majority of other reviewers, according to the weight of their karma. Most of the reviewing ought to be checklists and simple number scales so that they are able to have agreement and disagreement. Kind of like the Augur prediction markets project.

Project Review: After fundraisers are complete, they should have a timeline for sharing success or failure of their fundraisers, and then reviewers can review them again. An onchain or in-app karma system could give karma to good projects, take it away from bad projects, and give karma to participators.

Note: Karma gained and accumulated in this "Smart Charity" market would make for a great underlying source of karma that can be reapplied to decentralized lending markets and other markets requiring a high degree of trust. Individuals with karma could also nominate other people to make them more trustworthy.

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Preface: Game designers who work with Javascript could all submit their open source game projects to a forum where they are organized and and installed into an […]

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